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ABSTRACT
Recent studies have found that deep learning systems are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples; e.g., visually unrecognizable
adversarial images can easily be crafted to result in misclas-
sification. The robustness of neural networks has been stud-
ied extensively in the context of adversary detection, which
compares a metric that exhibits strong discriminate power be-
tween natural and adversarial examples. In this paper, we
propose to characterize the adversarial subspaces through the
lens of mutual information (MI) approximated by conditional
generation methods. We use MI as an information-theoretic
metric to strengthen existing defenses and improve the perfor-
mance of adversary detection. Experimental results on Mag-
Net defense demonstrate that our proposed MI detector can
strengthen its robustness against powerful adversarial attacks.
Index Terms— Adversarial example, conditional genera-
tion, detection, mutual information
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, deep learning has demonstrated impres-
sive performance on many tasks in machine learning, such
as speech recognition and image classification. However,
recent research has shown that well-trained deep neural net-
works (DNNs) are rather vulnerable to adversarial examples
[1, 2, 3, 4]. There have been many efforts on defending
against adversarial examples. In order to enhance the ro-
bustness of DNNs against adversarial perturbations, several
studies aim to characterize adversarial subspaces and develop
the countermeasures. For example, Ma et al. [5] character-
ize the dimensional properties of adversarial regions through
the use of local intrinsic dimensionality (LID). Nonetheless,
very recently Lu et al. [6] demonstrate the limitation of LID.
Generally speaking, the essence of adversary detection lies
in finding a metric that exhibits strong discriminative power
between natural and adversarial examples. More importantly,
when mounting the detector to identify adversarial inputs,
one should ensure minimal performance degradation on the
natural (clean) examples, which suggests a potential trade-off
between test accuracy and adversary detectability.
In this paper, we propose to characterize adversarial sub-
spaces by using mutual information (MI). Our approach is
novel in the sense that the MI is approximated by a well-
trained conditional generator owing to the recent advances
in generative adversarial networks (GANs) [7]. We demon-
strate the effectiveness of our approach on MagNet [8], a re-
cent defense method based on data reformation and adversary
detection. Experimental results show that when integrating
MagNet with our MI detector, the detection capability can be
significantly improved against powerful adversarial attacks.
2. BACKGROUND
Adversarial examples can be categorized into targeted and un-
targeted attacks based on attack objectives. The former falsely
renders the prediction of the targeted DNN model towards a
specific output, while the latter simply leads the targeted DNN
model to a falsified prediction.
2.1. Carlini and Wagner’s Attack (C&W attack)
Carlini and Wagner [9] propose an optimization-based frame-
work for targeted and untargeted attacks that can generate ad-
versarial examples with a small perturbation. They design an
L2 norm regularized loss function in addition to the model
prediction loss defined by the logit layer representations in
DNNs. C&W attack can successfully bypass undefended and
several defended DNNs by simply tuning the confidence pa-
rameter κ in the optimization process of generating adversar-
ial examples [10]. It can also be adopted to generate adver-
sarial examples based on L0 and L∞ distortion metrics.
C&W attack finds an effective adversarial perturbation by
solving the following optimization problem:
minimize
δ∈Rd
‖δ‖22 +c ·f(x0 +δ) such that x0 +δ ∈ [0, 1]d,
where d is the data dimension and [0, 1]d denotes the space
of valid data examples. For a natural example x0, the C&W
attack aims to find a small perturbation δ (evaluated by ‖δ‖2)
in order to preserve the visual similarity to x0 but will simul-
taneously deceive the classifier (evaluated by the f(·) term).
The hyperparameter c is used to balance these two losses.
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Let x = x0 + δ denote the perturbed example of x0. The
loss f is designed in a way that f(x) ≤ 0 if and only if
the classifier assigns x to a wrong class. In particular, for
untargeted attacks f(x) takes a hinge loss form defined as
f(x) = max{Z(x)lx0 −max(Z(x)i:i 6=lx0 ),−κ}, (1)
where Z(x) is the hidden representation of x in the pre-
softmax layer (also known as the logits) and lx0 is the ground
truth label of x0. Similar loss can be defined for targeted
attacks. The parameter κ ≥ 0 is a hyper-parameter governing
the model confidence of x. Setting a higher κ gives a stronger
adversarial example in classification confidence.
2.2. EAD: Elastic-Net Attack to Deep Neural Network
Chen et al. [11] propose EAD attack which has two decision
rules: one is elastic-net (EN) rule and the other is L1 rule.
In the process of attack optimization, the EN decision rule
selects the minimally-distorted adversarial example based on
the elastic-net loss of all successful adversarial examples in
the attack iterations. On the other hand, the L1 decision rule
refers to selecting the final adversarial examples based on the
minimum of L1 distortion among successful adversarial ex-
amples. In essence, EAD attack finds an effective adversarial
example by solving the following optimization problem:
minimizex∈Rd c · f(x) + ‖x− x0‖22 + β‖x− x0‖1
subject to x ∈ [0, 1]d.
The parameters c, β ≥ 0 are regularization parameters for
f and L1 distortion. Notably, the attack formulation of C&W
attack can be viewed as a special case of EAD attack when the
L1 penalty coefficient β = 0, reducing to a pure L2 distortion
based attack. In many cases, EAD attack can generate more
effective adversarial examples than C&W attack by consider-
ing the additional L1 regularization [11, 12, 6, 13].
2.3. MagNet: Defending Adversarial Examples with De-
tector and Reformer
Recently, strategies such as feature squeezing [14], manifold
projection [8], gradient and representation masking [15, 16],
and adversarial training [17], have been proposed as potential
defenses against adversarial examples.
In particular, the MagNet proposed in [8], which is com-
posed of an adversary detector and a data reformer, can not
only filter out adversarial examples but also rectify adversar-
ial examples via manifold projection learned from an auto-
encoder. The detector compares the statistical difference be-
tween an input example and the reconstructed one via an auto-
encoder. The reformer trained by an auto-encoder reforms
the input example and brings it close to the data manifold of
training data. MagNet declares a robust defense performance
against C&W attack under different confidence levels in the
Fig. 1. Pipeline of conditional generation and classification.
Fig. 2. Generated MNIST images using auto-encoder GAN
given an input image and different class (digit) conditions.
oblivious attack setting, where an attacker knows the model
parameters but is unaware of MagNet defense. In addition,
MagNet can also defend against many attacks such as Deep-
Fool [18], the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [2], and it-
erative FGSM [19]. However, Lu et al. [13] demonstrate that
despite its success in defending against L2 distortion based
adversarial examples on MNIST and CIFAR-10, in the same
oblivious attack setting MagNet is less effective against L1
distortion based adversarial examples crafted by EAD attack.
2.4. Conditional Generation
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) [7] have been re-
cently proposed to generate (fake) data examples that are dis-
tributionally similar to real ones from a low-dimensional la-
tent code space in an unsupervised manner. Conditional gen-
eration, i.e., generating data examples with specific proper-
ties, has also been made possible by incorporating side infor-
mation such as class labels into the GAN training. For exam-
ple, the α-GAN [20] combines the variational auto-encoder
(VAE) and a GAN for generation. The use of VAE enables the
capability of inferring the latent variable from training data in
addition to the realistic generative power of GAN.
For the purpose of adversary detection via mutual infor-
mation approximation based on conditional generation, in this
paper we adopt the α-GAN framework to train a conditional
generator using an auto-encoder + GAN architecture, where
the class condition is appended to the generation process, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows some generated hand-
written digits of our conditional generator trained on MNIST
given an input image and different class (digit) conditions.
3. PROPOSED METHOD
Characterizing adversarial subspaces aids in understanding
the behaviors of adversarial examples and potentially gaining
discriminate power against them [5]. In this paper, we use an
anto-encoder to learn the low-dimensional data manifold via
reconstruction and propose to use it for conditional generation
and approximating the mutual information (MI) as a discrim-
inative metric for detecting adversarial inputs. By treating an
input example as an instance drawn from an oracle data gen-
eration process, our main idea roots in the hypothesis that the
MI of a natural input before and after projecting to the (natu-
ral) data manifold should be maximally preserved, while the
MI of an adversarial input should be relatively small due to
its deviation to the data manifold. Therefore, the MI could be
used as a detector to distinguish adversarial inputs.
For any two discrete random variables X and Y , their MI
is defined as
I(W,Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |W ), (2)
where H(Y ) is the entropy of Y , which is defined as
H(Y ) = −
∑
y
pY (y) log pY (y) (3)
and pY (y) is the probability of Y = y. The conditional en-
tropy H(Y |W ) is defined as
H(Y |W ) = −
∑
w
pW (w)
(∑
y
pY |W (y|w) log pY |W (y|w)
)
,
(4)
where pY |W (y|w) is the probability of Y = y conditioned on
W = w.
Connecting the dots between MI and our adversary detec-
tion propoal, let f(·) : Rd 7→ RK denote the (DNN) classifier
that takes a d-dimensional vector input and outputs the pre-
diction results (i.e., probability distributions) over K classes,
and let Æ(·) : Rd 7→ Rd denote the auto-encoder trained
for reconstruction using training data. For any data input X
(either natural or adversarial), we proposes to use the MI of
f(X) and f(Æ(X)) as the metric for adversary detection.
Specifically, we consider the setting where W = f(X) and
Y = f(Æ(X)) in (2), and we use the Jaccard distance (a
properly normalized index between [0, 1])
J(W,Y ) = 1− d(W,Y )
H(W,Y )
(5)
for detection, where d(W,Y ) = H(W ) +H(Y )− 2I(W,Y )
and H(W,Y ) = H(Y ) + H(W ) − I(W,Y ). Here the Jac-
card distance measures the information-theoretic difference
between W and Y . In the adversary detection setting, large
Jaccard distance means that f(X) and f(Æ(X)) are more
distinct in distribution and thus indiate X and Æ(X) share
less similarity. Therefore, we declare X as an adversarial in-
put if J(f(X), f(Æ(X))) ≥ η, where η is a pre-specified
threshold that balances adversary detectability and rejection
rate on natural inputs.
We note that while the entropy H(f(Æ(X))) can be eas-
ily computed, the conditional entropy H(f(Æ(X))|f(X)) is
difficult to be evaluated when f is a DNN classifier. Here we
propose to use the conditional generator as introduced in Sec-
tion 2.4 to approximate the conditional entropy. In particular,
the conditional probability pf(Æ(X))|f(X)(y|w) is evaluated
by the prediction probability of the generated image X ′ to be
classified as y given the class condition w and the latent code
of X as the input to the conditional generator.
4. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we applied the proposed MI detector to the
MagNet defense against untargeted C&W and EAD attacks
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets under the oblivious attack
setting. For each dataset, we randomly selected 1000 cor-
rectly classified images from the test sets to generate adver-
sarial examples with different confidence levels. Under this
attack setting, it has been shown in [13] that while MagNet is
resilient to C&W attack, it is more vulnerable to EAD attack.
4.1. Experiment Setup and Parameter Setting
We followed the oblivious attack setting used in MagNet1,
where the adversarial examples are generated from the same
DNN but the adversary is unaware of the deployed defense.
The image classifiers on MNIST and CIFAR-10 are trained
with the same DNN architecture and training parameters in
[8]. For defending adversarial inputs, we report the classifi-
cation accuracy measured by the percentage of adversarial ex-
amples detected by the detectors or correctly classified after
passing the reformer. Higher classification accuracy means
better defense performance.
Similar to MagNet, in each dataset a validation set of
1000 images is used to determine the MI detector threshold
η, which is set such that the false-positive rate is 0.5%. The
α-GAN framework [20] was used to train our conditional gen-
erator consisting of an auto-encoder + GAN architecture.
We report the defense results of untargeted attacks since
they are generally more difficult to be detected than targeted
attacks. For C&W attack2 (L2 version), we used the same
parameters in [8] to generate adversarial examples. For EAD
attack3, we used the same parameters in [13] and generate
adversarial examples using both elastic-net (EN) and L1 de-
cision rules. All experiments were conducted using an Intel
Xeon E5-2620v4 CPU, 125 GB RAM and a NVIDIA TITAN
Xp GPU with 12 GB RAM.
4.2. Performance Evaluation on MNIST
Effect on natural examples. Without MagNet, the origi-
nal test accuracy is 99.42%. With MagNet, it is decreased
to 99.13%; with MI-strengthened MagNet, the test accuracy
1https://github.com/Trevillie/MagNet
2https://github.com/carlini/nn robust attacks.
3https://github.com/ysharma1126/EAD-Attack
Table 1. Comparison of MagNet and MI-strengthened MagNet on MNIST in terms of classification accuracy (%) of adversarial
examples. Our MI detector can improve the detection performance by up to 31.2%.
MNIST
MagNet MI-strengthened MagNet
Attack
method
C&W attack
(L2 version)
EAD attack
(L1 rule, β = 10−1)
EAD attack
(EN rule, β = 10−1)
C&W attack
(L2 version)
EAD attack
(L1 rule, β = 10−1)
EAD attack
(EN rule, β = 10−1)
κ
0 98.7 78.8 78.1 98.7 78.8 78.1
5 94.6 33.5 26.6 95.8 (↑ 1.2) 39.4 (↑ 5.9) 37.4 (↑ 10.8)
10 91.5 17.9 11.7 97.8 (↑ 6.3) 46.9 (↑ 29) 44.0 (↑ 32.3)
15 90.0 16.2 9.7 98.0 (↑ 8.0) 47.4 (↑ 31.2) 41.8 (↑ 32.1)
20 91.4 19.6 12.1 98.2 (↑ 6.8) 45.1 (↑ 25.5) 36.8 (↑ 24.7)
25 93.9 26.1 16.8 98.4 (↑ 4.5) 44.3 (↑ 18.2) 35.6 (↑ 18.8)
30 96.2 34.5 22.5 98.5 (↑ 2.3) 44.3 (↑ 9.8) 32.9 (↑ 10.4)
35 97.7 41.1 28.6 99.0 (↑ 1.3) 47.3 (↑ 6.2) 35.4 (↑ 6.8)
40 98.5 47.8 33.1 98.9 (↑ 0.4) 52.0 (↑ 4.2) 37.9 (↑ 4.8)
Table 2. Comparison of MagNet and MI-strengthened MagNet on CIFAR-10 in terms of classification accuracy (%) of adver-
sarial examples. Our MI detector can improve the detection performance by up to 3.8%.
CIFAR-10
MagNet MI-strengthened MagNet
Attack
method
C&W attack
(L2 version)
EAD attack
(L1 rule, β = 10−1)
EAD attack
(EN rule, β = 10−1)
C&W attack
(L2 version)
EAD attack
(L1 rule, β = 10−1)
EAD attack
(EN rule, β = 10−1)
κ
0 80.1 70.5 70.7 80.1 70.3 70.6
10 50.3 26.2 26.4 51.3 (↑ 1.0) 28.4 (↑ 2.2) 29.4 (↑ 3.0)
20 48.0 26.8 26.8 51.8 (↑ 3.8) 29.4 (↑ 2.6) 29.1 (↑ 2.3)
30 62.9 37.1 38.4 64.0 (↑ 1.1) 38.6 (↑ 1.5) 39.4 (↑ 1.0)
40 72.3 48.4 45.3 73.0 (↑ 0.7) 49.3 (↑ 0.9) 46.7 (↑ 1.4)
50 81.4 61.0 60.0 81.8 (↑ 0.4) 61.2 (↑ 0.2) 60.3 (↑ 0.3)
60 89.6 73.8 71.7 89.6 74.0 (↑ 0.2) 71.7
70 94.6 84.6 81.5 94.6 84.6 81.6 (↑ 0.1)
80 97.3 90.6 90.4 97.3 90.7 (↑ 0.1) 90.4
could still remain at 98.63%. The slight reduction in test ac-
curacy trades in enhanced adversary detectability.
Effect on adversarial examples. Table 1 shows the classi-
fication accuracy of adversarial examples on MNIST. While
MagNet is robust to C&W attack in the oblivious attack
setting, it is shown to be less effective against EAD at-
tack [13], especially for medium confidence levels (e.g.,
κ = {10, 15, 20}). On the other hand, our MI-strengthened
MagNet can improve the detection performance by up to
31.2%, highlighting the utility of approximating MI via con-
ditional generation for characterizing adversarial subspaces.
4.3. Performance Evaluation on CIFAR-10
Effect on natural examples. Without MagNet, the test ac-
curacy is 86.91%. With MagNet, it reduced to 83.33%; with
MI-strengthened MagNet, it becomes 83.18%.
Effect on adversarial examples. Comparing to MNIST, on
CIFAR-10 the MI-strengthened MagNet provides less im-
provement (up to 3.8%) in adversary detection. One possible
explanation is that for most κ values the original MagNet
already performs better on CIFAR-10 than on MNIST. We
also conjecture that the performance of MI detector is closely
associated with the capability of the conditional generator,
as we observe that the quality of the generated images on
MNIST is much better than those on CIFAR-10.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose to utilize the mutual information
(MI) and data manifold of deep neural networks as a novel
information-theoretic metric to characterize and distinguish
adversarial inputs, where the MI is approximated by a well-
trained conditional generator. The experimental results show
that our MI detector can effectively strengthen the detection
capability of MagNet defense while causing negligible effect
on test accuracy. Our future work includes further exploring
the utility of MI and conditional generation for adversarial
robustness and extending our detector to other defenses.
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